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Populism is dead, but the electoral 
system is its iron lung 
By Dr Jacob Salder, Alliance Manchester Business School 
It started off as tense, but quickly became rather boring, like slowly 
watching the sun burn out and waiting for its inevitable impact. The 
pedestrian results of last week’s US Presidential election quickly lost 
their lustre, even if the vote seemed to be turning the way of integrity. 
As I write this, the signs are Joe Biden will be President, and despite 
his rhetoric of unity will probably oversee a further period of civil 
unrest and instability for America. Especially in those southern states 
which have always had an uncomfortable relationship with the Union 
and Capitol Hill. 
There has been plenty of discussion on whether Biden’s performance 
represents a beginning of the end of ‘Trumpism’. This to me seems a 
strange term; I don’t actually know what ‘Trumpism’ is. Its core 
principle – similar to ‘Borisism’ – seems to be overdependence on 
bully and bluster to promote a platitudinous rhetoric offering hollow 
detail to address the challenging and complex problems of 
contemporary society. 
The general feeling for several US commentators is in the short term, 
Trumpism is going nowhere. Bearing in mind his empowerment of 
disregarded voters – regardless how imagined – has been proclaimed 
a general success, and is similarly replicated in certain trends in 
Europe, there seems mileage in this campaign yet with or without its 
tangerine cheerleader. 
My CBS colleague, David Hearne, shared his concerns about 
populism being here to stay in a recent blog[i]. Considering Trump’s 
performance, the swing to the Conservatives in 2019’s UK general 
election, and showings in Hungary, Poland, and to a lesser extent 
France and Italy, populism it seems is alive and well in the West. 
The concerns here are that more conventional forms of political 
discourse have failed to deliver requisite outcomes for a set of core 
constituents, often typified as the ‘left behind’ or some other 
articulation of a victim class. This victim class seem strangely to get 
angrier the more enfranchised they become. 
In response to David’s arguments, I will take another line here. 
Populism does indeed look like it has gathered a head of steam. But 
in my view this is not the outcome of renewed significance amongst 
nationalist movements, but indicative of the failings of an ill-designed 
set of electoral systems and processes which were flawed at the 
outset, let alone in their attempts to deal with the complexities and 
adaptations of contemporary life. 
Let’s start with the obvious; our flawed electoral system. If by some 
minor miracle Trump does win a second term, this disregards the 
elephant in the room of the popular vote. Whilst Clinton in 2016 
outperformed Trump by 3m votes, Biden increased this gap to 4m, or 
more as the count comes in (bear in mind California was called on 
only 77%). In what should be a first-past-the-post battle, to reward on 
two consecutive occasions a loser – and a loser by a significant 
margin – is unjustifiable. And this isn’t just the Presidency. Both the 
Senate and the House of Representatives are elected through 
systems weighted in favour of more traditional, rural – and therefore 
Republican – areas[ii]. Similarly, in the UK, the application of a FPTP 
electoral system in a multi-party environment ensures the hegemony 
of minority government, ripe for exploitation. 
Second is the failure of political parties. Following last years’ election I 
blogged about the failures of the left, fragmented in the UK across 
multiple parties, and their ability to hand the Conservatives power[iii]. 
But the Conservatives are not blameless here, embracing principles of 
cronyism and centralisation where free markets and small businesses 
have conventionally sat. The continued patronage of Party by one-
nation Tories such as Theresa May and Jeremy Hunt illustrates how 
malleable are principles for the right when power is concerned. 
Third is a failure of message. The former Democratic Presidential 
candidate Andrew Yang last week commented on the failure of 
Democrats to engage with normal people and everyday Americans. 
Such accusations don’t stack up against the distribution of the vote, 
the New York Times exit poll indicating the swing to Trump occurred 
singularly in the highest earning bracket[iv]. There does however 
remain an ongoing issue in terms of the needs and representation of 
urban versus rural working classes and white versus BAME groups. 
The question here, for both Democrats in the US and Labour in the 
UK, is how messages of hollow populism founded on platitudinous 
rhetoric of free trade gain traction over those of investment in support 
infrastructure. 
Most prominently, however, is a failure of citizens. Let’s be clear here 
that populism, despite its prolonged 15 minutes in the sun, has never 
taken the hold both we and it often proclaim. Authoritarian 
governments have emerged in areas with cultural tendencies toward 
authoritarianism (I’m looking at you, Poland and Hungary), and Italy’s 
Five Star has become a major political player at the cost of the 
Centre-Left. But in France, Le Pen never seriously contested Macron 
in 2017, and the Greens outperformed the National Rally in this year’s 
municipal elections. Austria in 2019 saw a 10% swing away from the 
FPO, AfD achieved only 12.6% of the national vote in Germany, and 
Geert Wilders’ PVV only 13% in the Netherlands. 
Where it has been successful, in the US and UK, is singularly through 
the appropriation of existing institutions and associated loyalty to 
these parties; had Farage’s Brexit Party not stood down for the Tories 
in certain seats last year, we would have a very different Government 
now. The foothold is here not the result of any great swing toward 
populism, but the refusal of an embedded party faithful to look 
elsewhere. 
There is no doubt here populists have played the system and played it 
well; this should not be confused with a cultural shift toward populist 
values. When scaled back beyond the rhetoric to consider political 
engagement, aside from the Brexit vote it is very difficult to see these 
signals of populism becoming a major force beyond Tufton Street’s 
Twitter feed. 
In the US, the Republicans – no strangers to electoral success before 
Trump came along – will soon realise there is more traction in a 
moderate conservative message to win back the key centre ground in 
a two-party system. Which largely leaves the UK alone with its 
populist problem. Here there is no short-term solution without electoral 
reform and whilst the fragmented left continues to fight a pointless 
ideological war. Populism however is not a value resurgent; it is 
simply an effective representation of a catalogue of failures amongst 
outdated political processes.       
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